In this paper we analyze players' long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imperfect monitoring in a large population. Players can observe signals corresponding to other players' unseen actions and use the proposed simple or maximum likelihood estimation algorithm to extract information from the signals. In the simple learning process we find conditions for the risk-dominant and the non-risk-dominant equilibria to emerge alone in the long run. Furthermore, we find that the two equilibria can coexist in the long run. In contrast, the coexistence of the two equilibria is the only limit distribution under the maximum likelihood estimation learning algorithm. We also analyze the long-run equilibria of other 2 × 2 symmetric games under imperfect monitoring.
Introduction
The multiplicity of Nash equilibria has weakened the prediction power and application potentials of game theory on human behavior. The coordination game with risk-and payoffdominant equilibria is a typical example. The evolutionary learning process is a dynamic method to refine Nash equilibria. Various hypotheses have been given in the literature to characterize players' boundedly rational behavior, resulting in the distinct emergence of Nash equilibrium in the long run. For instance, under the best-response dynamics, Young (1993) , Ellison (1993) , and Blume (1993) , (1995) showed that players will eventually coordinate at a risk-dominant equilibrium in the long run. However, the equilibrium could be changed to a payoff-dominant equilibrium when state-dependent (see, e.g. Bergin and Lipman (1996) ) or time-dependent mutations (see, e.g. Robles (1998) and Chen and Chow (2001) ) are imposed. On the other hand, under Darwinian-type dynamics, Kandori et al. (1993) and Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) demonstrated that different equilibria will emerge in the long run when players'matching methods are distinct. Kandori et al. (1993) showed that the risk-dominant equilibrium will be Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games 389 chosen when individuals play with all other players, while Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) proved that the payoff-dominant equilibrium will be selected when players are randomly paired to play the game multiple rounds per period. However, Miekisz (2005) showed that the two models would yield the same results if the number of players approaches infinity.
Although acquiring different conclusions, all the above models assume that players' actions and payoffs are observable. However, examples of unseen players' actions, with the visual signals relating stochastically to the underlying actions, are numerous in the real world. For instance, although the regulator does not know a firm's exact pollution-abatement activities, pollutant emissions can be measured and depend on a firm's abatement levels and some random factors, such as weather conditions. In principal and agent problems, agents' efforts are usually unseen to principals. However, outputs are correlated with agents' efforts and can be observed. In oligopolistic markets, output prices are indicators of the unknown product quality even though they are also affected by factors such as stochastic market demands.
In this paper we aim to analyze equilibrium selection for a large population under evolutionary learning processes with imperfect monitoring of players' actions and payoffs. Our models are built in Section 2. At the beginning of each time period, players know only their own actions and payoffs that occurred in the last period, while the signals corresponding to other players' underlying actions in the last period are revealed publicly. There are two possible signals for each action: the prime signal is the one more likely to occur. The correlations between signals and the underlying actions are assumed to be fixed over time and across players. Two learning schemes are proposed to represent players' distinct ways of using signals to form their beliefs about their opponents' current plays. Then, based on the beliefs, players choose actions to maximize their expected current payoffs. Different from previous evolutionary models examined in Vega-Redondo (1995), we suppose no mutation on players' rational choices as well as on players' expectation updating process.
In the simple learning process players are assumed to use signals' occurring frequencies in the last period to simultaneously forecast their opponents' current behavior. The associated dynamic system is a two-state Markov chain. In previous evolutionary models, mutation is the driving force making transitions between equilibria possible. In contrast, random signals in our model play the role of mutation. As shown in Theorem 1, below, players' long-run behavior in a large population is completely determined by the correlation between the signals and their underlying actions. This is because the law of large numbers (LLN) is in force as the population size grows to infinity. As a consequence, players would eventually select the risk-dominant equilibrium in case the non-risk-dominant strategy and its prime signal are not highly correlated. For the rest cases, the non-risk-dominant equilibrium could emerge alone or players could visit both equilibria with positive probability in the long run.
Inspired by the broad usage of the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) in empirical works, we use the MLE as our second learning algorithm. In the MLE learning process, players are assumed to adopt the maximum likelihood estimate of the observed signals to form expectations about their opponents' current plays. The associated dynamic system is also a two-state Markov chain. However, unlike in the simple learning process, the coexistence of the risk-dominant and the non-risk-dominant equilibria is shown in Theorem 2, below, as the only long-run limit for a large population. This demonstrates that the equilibrium selection is quite sensitive to the signal handling scheme when players cannot observe other players' actions and payoffs.
Besides coordination games, we also examine the limit distribution of other 2 × 2 symmetric games under these two learning algorithms. Similar conclusions are reached.
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H.-C. CHEN AND Y. CHOW Our models differ from the repeated prisoner's dilemma games with imperfect monitoring (see, e.g. Fudenberg et al. (1994) , Sekiguchi (1997) , Compte (2002) , and Mailath and Morris (2002) ) in that our players are myopically rational while their players take actions to maximize the expected discounted payoffs (i.e. longsightedly rational). Chen et al. (2006) examined myopically rational players' long-run behavior under imperfect monitoring, but constructed a model different from ours in two respects. Firstly, they adopted the Bayesian learning process, which is quite complicated and less compatible with the spirit of players' bounded rationality. Secondly, they only analyzed the coordination games, while we consider all 2 × 2 symmetric games.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the coordination-game models and the associated outcomes. In Section 3 we analyze other 2 × 2 symmetric games. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 4 and give the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 4 in Section 5.
The models
There are N players, where N is finite and even. At each time period t, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , players are randomly and independently matched in pairs to play the coordination game shown in Figure 1 is referred to as the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Later, our results will show that it is the correlation between actions and signals which determines players' long-run behavior and not whether (B, B) is payoff-dominant. Thus, the condition d > a is not assumed to hold here. Define
Then (q * , 1 − q * ) is the unique mixed Nash equilibrium. It is assumed that players know only their own actions and payoffs at each time period. However, signals corresponding to players' underlying actions are publicly observable at each time period. Denote by {Ā,B} the signal set for all players. The relations between signals and the underlying actions are described by the following conditional probabilities:
Hence, P(B | A) = 1 − u < Since players' actions are unobservable here, in the following two subsections we propose using the simple and the MLE processes as two possible learning mechanisms to extract information about players' current plays from signals.
The simple learning process
. . , Y Nt ) ∈ {Ā,B} N be the revealed signal of all players at time t, and let n(Ā, Y t ) = |{1 ≤ j ≤ N : Y j,t =Ā}| be the number of signalĀ in Y t . SinceĀ andB are respectively the prime signal for action A and B, our simple learning process assumes that players will naively treat the signalsĀ andB as the actions A and B, respectively. Because we are mainly interested in a large population size
, as the probability that player i will match with a player of action A when he is randomly paired with the other players in action updating. Therefore, the expected payoff of player i at time (t + 1) is
A simple calculation shows that
By maximizing one's expected payoff, player i will choose action A at time t + 1 if and only if
Since a − c > d − b > 0 by assumption, (3) and (4) easily imply that player i will choose action A at time t + 1 if and only if n(Ā,
In other words, player i will choose action A for the next period if and only if the number of signalĀ observed at present is no less than Nq * . It is worth mentioning that here no mutation or the possibility of experimentating with new strategies is considered after players have chosen their rational actions.
Since the revealed signals are public information and all players adopt the same decision rule to simultaneously update their next actions, it is clear from (5) that players would take an identical action at each period. As a result, the evolutionary process above can be represented by a time-homogeneous Markov chain {X t : t ≥ 1} on the state space {A, B}, where A = (A, A, . . . , A) and B = (B, B, . . . , B) are the all-A and all-B action profiles, respectively. Moreover, its transition matrix
where 
Here
, as players reveal their signals independently according to (2). The ergodic theorem for Markov chains implies that, independent of the initial distribution, the following ergodic distribution exists:
Remember that we are interested in (p N (A), p N (B)) for a large population. For instance, although min(p N (A), p N (B)) > 0 for any fixed population size N by the ergodic theorem, we wonder when lim inf N→∞ min(p N (A), p N (B)) > 0, meaning that players will visit both equilibria with positive probability.
Taking advantage of the exact form (9), we now study the asymptotic behavior of (p N (A), p N (B)). By (9),
Hence, it is enough to study the ratio of p BA (N) and p AB (N ). Introduce independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli random variables {Y i : i ≥ 1} and {Z i : i ≥ 1} with
Then (7) and (8) can be expressed as
By (1) and (2), u > 1 2 > q * . Then (11), (12), and the LLN imply that
Similarly,
For the case in which 1 − v = q * , we may apply the central limit theorem (CLT) to obtain
(15) Combining (10) and (13)- (15), we can prove Theorem 1(a), below. (13) and (14). In view of (10), we have to compare the convergence rate to 0 of p BA (N ) with that of p AB (N ). Chernoff's theorem of large deviations (see, e.g. Billingsley (1995, p. 151) ) can be applied to show that, for large N,
where
. Simple calculus yields the infinimum at t * = log(u(1 − q * )/(1 − u)q * ) and, thus, log
Theorem 1(b)(i) and (ii) follow easily from (10) and (16)- (18), except that we still need to check that
, is most subtle, as the previous argument is no longer decisive. Using brute-force computations, we will show in Section 5 that
where {x} = x − x lies in [0, 1) and x is the least integer greater than or equal to x. Then Theorem 1(b)(iii) follows easily from (10).
In summary, Theorem 1 shows that players' long-run behavior is determined by q * in (1) and the correlation between signals and their underlying actions, (2). Depending on the conditions specified in Theorem 1, the risk-dominant equilibrium, the non-risk-dominant equilibrium, or coexistence of both equilibria could emerge in the long run when the population size N is large enough.
As a side result, this model can be compared with those under perfect monitoring. In our setup two nonprime signals reflecting different strategies can be regarded as two kinds of mutation. The noises of the signals, measured by (1 − u) = ε α and (1 − v) = ε η , are then interpreted as the associated mutation rates. Here, ε, α, and η are positive constants. Being the mutation rate, we may assume that ε is small. By (12),
Using Nq * = Nq * + {Nq * } and (10),
For the case in which α = ηq * /(1 − q * ), the above formula is simplified as
Since {Nq * } ∈ [0, 1), the following can be easily verified using ( Except for the critical case, α = ηq * /(1 − q * ), Proposition 1 is a special case in Bergin and Lipman (1996) , where the Darwinian-type dynamics were adopted on the state space {A, B} N . Kandori et al. (1993) studied the same dynamics, but with 1 − u = 1 − v (that is, with equal mutation rates).
Generally speaking, the long-run equilibrium would depend on the relative depths of the basins of attraction at the two equilibria. Here, the depths of the basins of attraction at the risk-dominant and the non-risk-dominant equilibria are proportional to the values of α and η, respectively. The larger α is, the more difficult it is to jump out from the risk-dominant equilibrium; hence, the deeper the basin of attraction is at the risk-dominant equilibrium. A similar remark holds for η. It is no surprise that lim ε→0 p N (A) = 1 or 0 if α is large enough or small enough, respectively, as shown in Proposition 1(a). However, it may not be easy to see that α = ηq * /(1 − q * ) is the critical value and that in this case the ergodic distribution depends on {Nq * }(η + α) − α. Note that (21) holds for any finite N .
The MLE learning process
In this subsection we explore players' long-run behavior under the MLE learning algorithm.
. . , Y Nt ) ∈ {A, B} N be the revealed signal of all players at time t and let y t = (y 1t , y 2t , . . . , y Nt ) be its realization. Since the revealed signals are public information and all players adopt the same decision rule to simultaneously update their next actions, the process can be represented as in Section 2.1 by a time-homogeneous Markov process {X t : t ≥ 1} with state space {A, B}. Players are presumed to compare P(Y t = y t |X t = A) with P(Y t = y t |X t = B). If
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a preset threshold, players are hypothesized to guessX t = A and, thus, adopt action A at time t + 1. Otherwise, players would adopt action B. It is easy to see from (2) that
where k = n(Ā, y t ) := |{1 ≤ j ≤ N : y j,t =Ā}| is the number of signalĀ in y t . Thus,
By taking the logarithm, a simple calculation shows that
By Bayes rule,
Then, from (22) and (24), we obtain
where {Y i , Z i } are the i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables given in (11). A similar expression can be obtained for P(X t+1 = B). As a consequence, the transition matrix of {X t : t ≥ 1} is similar to (6) except that now The method used in Section 2.1 can be repeated to find its ergodic distribution:
(p N (A),p N (B)) := lim t→∞ (P(X t = A), P(X t = B)).
Since we still have the following analog to (10):
it suffices to study the ratio of p BA (N) and p AB (N). It will be shown in Section 5 that
where γ * is given in (24). As (Nγ * + δ)/N ≈ γ * for large N , the LLN implies that lim N p AB (N ) = lim N p BA (N ) = 0. Then Chernoff's theorem can be applied to show that, for large N,
A similar calculation to that used in (16) and (17) shows that
and then
Hence,ρ 2 =ρ 1 and the order estimates in (28) are not good enough. We have to estimate p AB (N ) and p BA (N ) directly as we did in Theorem 1(b)(iii). Similar to (19), we will show in Section 5 that
Note that the constants γ * and δ are defined in (24). In view of (26), we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the MLE learning algorithm (23), lim inf
In view of (23) and (24), players' optimal behavior is determined by whether the number of A in the revealed signal exceeds Nγ * + δ, which depends on u, v, and β but not on the payoff parameters a, b, c, and d. Thus, Theorem 2 remains true for other 2 × 2 symmetric games as long as players adopt the MLE learning algorithm.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that players will visit the risk-dominant and the non-risk-dominant equilibria with positive probability in the long run under the MLE learning process, rather than stick to one equilibrium. Because the exponent {Nγ * + δ} in (29) lies in [0, 1) and varies with N by (27) , lim N (p N (A),p N (B) ) does not exist. Hence, the probability for players to visit the two equilibria in the long run is unlikely to equal the mixed Nash equilibrium, (q * , 1 − q * ), of the coordination game.
Compared with Theorem 1, we discover that players' long-run behavior under imperfect monitoring is fairly sensitive to the information-extracting mechanism as N tends to ∞.
Finally, these results can be compared with those under perfect monitoring. As in Proposition 1, we may regard the nonprime signals reflecting different strategies as two kinds of mutation with rates (1 − u) and (1 − v). Then it can be shown that players' long-run behavior depends on how fast both mutation rates, 1 − u and 1 − v, tend to 0. Since its proof and interpretation are the same as those of Proposition 1, they are omitted here.
Other symmetric 2 × 2 games
In addition to coordination games there are two other generic types of 2×2 symmetric games. They are games with a dominant strategy and games with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium. We analyze them below.
As in Section 2.1, the simultaneous simple learning process for any of these two games is still a Markov chain on the state space {A, B}. Without causing any confusion, we still denote by {X t : t ≥ 1} the associated dynamic process.
The payoff for games with a strictly dominant equilibrium is as shown in Figure The payoff structure for games with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium is as shown in Figure 1 , but with c > a and b > d. Then (A, B), (B, A) , and the mixed strategy (q * , 1 − q * ) are the Nash equilibria, where q * ∈ (0, 1) is defined in (1) but the condition that q * < 
and
where {Y i , Z i } are the i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables given in (11). Let (p N (A), p N (B) ) be the ergodic distribution of {X t : t ≥ 1}. Then (9) and (10) still hold since (30) and (31) look like the transition probabilities in (12). By repeating the arguments in Theorem 1, the following result is proved in Section 5. 
(e) Finally, for the case in which u < q
Theorem 4 shows that players' long-run behavior depends not only on the relative values of 1 − v and q * , but also on the relative magnitudes of u and q * . This is because the condition that q * < 1 2 is not required, as in Section 2.1. In the simple learning process, a players' long-run behavior is mainly determined by signals' occurring frequencies. Thus, it is not a surprise to have A or B alone in the long run even though they are not Nash equilibria. Theorem 4(b) and (c) indicate that coexistence of both A or B is probable. The unique symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium could possibly survive only when u < q
For the MLE learning process, Theorem 2 still holds as remarked in the paragraph after Theorem 2.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed players'long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imperfect monitoring in a large population. Players can only observe public signals relating to other players' underlying actions, and can employ the simple or the MLE learning process to form expectations about their opponents' current plays based on the signals. In our setup, random signals are like mutations in the perfect monitoring literature, which make transitions Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games 399 between equilibria possible. However, unlike perfect-monitoring models with state-and timeinvariant mutations, the random signals setup may not be able to refine Nash equilibria. For instance, Theorem 1 shows that in the simple learning process the risk-dominant equilibrium, the non-risk-dominant equilibrium, or coexistence of both equilibria could appear in the long run. Which equilibrium will survive in the long run would depend on the correlation degrees between signals and their underlying actions. In contrast, Theorem 2 shows that coexistence of the two equilibria is the unique long-run limit in the MLE learning process. All together, it suggests that players' means to extract information from the observed signals has a critical impact on their long-run behavior in evolutionary games with imperfect monitoring. Theorems 3 and 4 show that similar conclusions can be extended to other 2 × 2 symmetric games with imperfect monitoring.
In our model players are assumed to update their actions simultaneously at each time period. This presumption makes our dynamics a simple two-state Markov chain with state space {A, B}. The corresponding ergodic distribution can then be explicitly specified as in (10). This is the main reason why players'long-run behavior in a large population can be thoroughly determined, as in Theorems 1-4 of this paper.
There are two other updating schemes. In a sequential or random agent updating scheme (see, e.g. Blume (1995) and Miekisz (2005) ), only one player is allowed to update his action per period. The other scheme lets all players have the same positive revision probability at each time period (see, e.g. Vega-Redondo (1997), Eshel et al. (1998), and Miekisz (2005) ). Under these two updating schemes, the associated dynamic systems become a Markov chain with N + 1 and 2 N states, respectively. In either case it is much more complicated than ours. As shown by Eshel et al. (1998) and Miekisz (2005) , players' long-run behavior could change accordingly. It would be interesting to see in the future how players' long-run behavior changes when these two updating schemes are adopted in our models.
Proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 4

Proof of Theorem 1
It remains to verify (19) for part (b)(iii). By (16),
(32) Using Nq * = Nq * + {Nq * },
Since Nq * − j ≤ Nq * for j ≥ 1, we find that, for each fixed l ≥ 1, 
Similarly, from (12) we have
and, thus,
Since then (19) follows by taking the ratio of (34) and (35).
Proof of Theorem 2
It remains to verify (27) and (29). The first one is easy. Since
as given in (24), we have 1
. By symmetry, it is enough to prove the first inequality in (27). A simple calculation shows that this is equivalent to
where (32) and (35), respectively. Replacing Nq * in (33) and (35) by Nγ * + δ, we will obtain in a parallel way the following analogs to (34) and (36) Taking the ratio of these two formulae, we obtain (29) after a little calculation. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
We follow the same procedure as in Theorem 1. Applying the LLN and CLT to (30), Since (10) remains valid for the present ergodic distribution (p N (A), p N (B) ), all the conclusions in parts (a)-(d) follow easily from (38) and (39).
For part (e), lim N p AB (N ) = lim N p BA (N) = 0 as u < q * < 1 − v now. We are obliged to compare their convergence rates to 0 in order to find the limit via (10). As in (16) Rewrite (30) and (31) respectively as
(1 − Z i ) ≥ N(1 − q * ) .
These equations are the same as (32) and (35) 
Part (e)(ii) is verified in view of (10). This completes the proof.
